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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JAMES L. BARKER, JR., TRUSTEE 
IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE 
RAY DUNHAM, VOL UN TAR Y 
BANKRUPT, 
Platnti!f and Aptpellant. 
vs. 
GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND LEODA 
S. DUNHAM, HIS WIFE, 
Defendants and Resp-ondents. 
Case No. 
9012 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, as trustee in the voluntary bankruptcy 
of the defendant, George Ray Dunham, brought this action 
in behalf of the only two creditors named in the bankrupt's 
petition to have a certain conveyance of real property from 
the voluntary bankrupt to his defendant wife, set aside as 
a fraudulent conveyance made with intent to hinder, delay 
and defraud said creditors. 
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From an adverse judgment of the Court below, sitting 
without a jury, plaintiff brings his case to this Honorable 
Court on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As a result of an automobile accident which occurred 
on November 8, 1953, judgments were entered against the 
defendant, George R. Dunham in favor of Fred B. Garrett 
and Bruce R. Sizemore in the sum of $51,840.00, plus costs, 
in the District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, on 
September 10, 1954 (R. 9, 10, 28, 65). La Mar Duncan 
served as counsel for the defendant, George R. Dunham, 
during the. entire course of this litigation (Tr. 33, 34). 
Nineteen days following this automobile accident, in which 
the defendant, George R. Dunham, was seriously injured 
and hospitalized, there was recorded in the office of the 
County Recorder of Summit County, a warranty deed dated 
upon its face, November 1, 1952, and purporting to have 
been acknowledged before La Mar Duncan on that same 
date, conveying all of defendant George R. Dunham's inter-
est in and to certain real property located in Summit County, 
Utah, to his wife, the defendant Leoda S. Dunham (R. 10, 
28, 118, 119, Tr. 26, 51). This property had been conveyed 
to GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND LEODA S. DUNHAM, 
HIS WIFE, AS JOINT TENANTS WITH FULL RIGHTS 
OF SURVIVORSHIP, AND NOT AS TENANTS IN COM-
MON, by warranty deed dated January 6, 1951, from Carrie 
N. Kirkpatrick, which was recorded January 12, 1951 (R. 
94) . The deed from George R. Dunham to his wife did not 
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include improvements and waters rights as are contained 
in the deed from Carrie N. Kirkpatrick to the defendants 
as joint tenants (See Plaintiff's exhibits No. 1 and No. 13, 
R. 94, 118, 119). The defendants' own testimony indicates 
that the property was originally sold in 1944 by Carrie N. 
Kirkpatrick upon contract to George R. Dunham alone (Tr. 
16-17, 21, 60, 64-67, 77). 
Subsequent to November 1, 1952, claimed by defendants 
to be the date of execution and delivery of the deed from 
the defendant husband to his wife, and prior to November 
8, 1953, the date of the automobile accident which resulted in 
the judgments against Mr. Dunham, the defendants con-
veyed eight separate parcels of the land acquired from 
Carrie N. Kirkpatrick and each such deed showed the grant-
ors to be GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND LEODA S. DUN-
HAM, HIS WIFE. (See plaintiff's exhibits Numbers 2-9, 
inclusive, R. 96-111). On October 22, 1953, just seventeen 
days before the automobile accident referred to above, there 
was recorded at the request of George R. Dunham, a subdi-
vision plat of Kamp Killkare, being a portion of the land 
conveyed to the defendants by Carrie N. Kirkpatrick. (See 
plaintiff's exhibit No. 12, R. 116-117, as further explained 
by the County Recorder in Tr. 128-130). And on October 
26, 1953, just thirteen days before the accident, a mortgage 
was negotiated on the subject property with GEORGE R. 
DUNHAM AND LEODA S. DUNHAM, HIS WIFE, named 
as mortgagors. (See plaintiff's exhibit No. 15, R. 123-125). 
Following the automobile accident on November 8, 1953, 
and the recording of the deed from Mr. Dunham to his wife 
on November 27, 1953, the manner of conveying and en-
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cumbering the land was radically changed by defendants. 
Thus a mortgage to Kamas State Bank, executed on April 
12, 1954, designating the mortgagors. as LEODA S. DUN-
HAM AND GEORGE R. DUNHAM, HER HUSBAND, was 
signed by Mrs. Dunham only. (See plaintiff's exhibit No. 
14, R. 120-122). In addition warranty deeds. of small parcels 
of land sold to Roy M. Thornton and Anna Ruth Thornton, 
his wife, in February 1, 1954, and to Harold Sanders and 
Edith Sanders, his wife, in June 21, 1954, were executed 
solely by Mrs. Dunham. (See Plaintiff's exhibits No. 10 
and 11, R. 112-115). 
It is undisputed that no consideration or payment was 
given to defendant George R. Dunham by his wife for the 
transfer of title into her name only and that said George 
R. Dunham owned no property after the delivery of the 
Deed conveying his interest to his wife. (Pre-trial Order, 
Sections 2 (c) and (d) , R. 52) . Defendant Leoda S. Dun-
ham testified that her husband had not been employed, 
other than helping her, since 1951 (Tr. 78). She also testi-
fied that she did not pay him a salary or give him an allow-
ance for his services (Tr. 79). However, at the purported 
time of executing the deed conveying his interest to his wife 
Mr. Dunham was obligated on a note secured by a mortgage 
to the Coalville Bank (Tr. 74-75, 141). He thereafter obli-
gated himself on another note secured by a mortgage to the 
Kamas State Bank on October 26, 1953. (See plaintiff's 
exhibit No. 15, R. 123-125). 
Mrs. Dunham further testified that she gave her hus-
band full authority to handle the management of the sale of 
lots upon the property because of her lack of knowledge in 
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real estate matters (Tr. 66, 139). She further testified that 
her husband lived upon the property and that she allowed 
him to tell other people that he owned the property (Tr. 
78-79). The testimony of Herbert Frank Heinhold, who 
was one of the purchasers of the lot from the defendants 
on August 3, 1953, shortly before the automobile accident, 
further emphasizes the fact that Mr. Dunham exercised all 
the power of an owner over this property by showing it to 
prospective purchasers and accepting payment upon con-
summated sales without limitation by his wife (Tr. 112-
115). 
On August 17, 1956, the defendant George R. Dunham 
filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy, No. B-279-56, 
with the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of Utah, naming as his only creditors Fred B. Garrett 
and Bruce R. Sizemore, and on August 22, 1956, he was 
duly adjudged a bankrupt in said proceedings and on Sep-
tember 12, 1956, the plaintiff was appointed trustee of the 
bankrupt's estate for the benefit of creditors. (See para-
graphs 1, 2 and 3 of plaintiff's amended complaint admitted 
in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the fourth defense in defendant's 
answer, R. 9, 28) . 
The evidence in support of the defendants' contention 
that the deed in question did not constitute a fraudulent 
conveyance is conflicting and manifestly inconsistent. Mr. 
Dunham testified that the property was originally purchased 
with his wife's own money, because he drank up all he made 
but he could not explain why the purchase contract was 
originally put in his own name alone (Tr. 23). He also 
testified that he "partially" negotiated the sale with Mrs. 
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Kirkpatrick (Tr. 22). As to the date and place of execution 
of the deed in question, Mr. Dunham testified as follows, 
at page 26-27 of the transcript: 
"Q. Is that your signature at the bottom, Mr. 
Dunham? 
"A. It looks like it. You bet. It must be. 
"Q. That is your signature? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Where did you write that signature? 
"A. I don't remember. 
"Q. Were you in the hospital at the time, Mr. 
Dunham? 
"A. I wouldn't-/ can't remember when that 
was signed. 
"Q. Did Mr. Duncan prepare this deed and 
bring it to you, Mr. Dunham, at the hospital? 
"A. I don't remember if anybody brought it to 
me, but that is my signature. I don't know where it 
was executed. I don't know where it was signed be-
cause I don't remember. 
"Q. Now, Mr. Dunham, isn't it true that Mr. 
Duncan brought this to you in November of 1953 
when you were in the Veterans Hospital after the 
accident that you had when you injured yourself and 
Mr. Sizemore and Mr. Garrett? 
"Mr. Pratt: If the court please, I will object 
to that question. I think it is an attempt to vary this 
document which he's introduced as an exhibit and 
which is dated November 1, 1952, and acknowledged. 
"THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
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"Q. Isn't that the place and the time that you 
signed this document when you were in fear of your 
life because of that accident? 
"A. It could be very well. 
"MR. PRATT: Now, if the court please, which 
time are we talking about? Are we talking about the 
time on the deed or some other time? 
"MR. CASSITY : I am talking about the time 
that I stated. It is very clear. 
"THE COURT: You don't need to argue with 
counsel or explain to him. 
"Q. Do you remember whether anyone aside 
from yourself and Mr. Duncan was present at the 
time you signed this deed? 
"A. I don't even remember when I signed it." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mrs. Dunham testified that she and her husband were 
working as cooks for the Union Pacific Railroad when the 
property was purchased from Mrs. Kirkpatrick (Tr. 52-53) 
and that Mr. Dunham did not work for anyone else during 
the periods of time they operated the beer tavern after pur-
chasing it (Tr. 54). She testified that she earned a little 
under two hundred dollars per month and her husband 
earned about two hundred twenty-five dollars per month 
while working for the railroad (Tr. 91) and that she had 
received seven hundred dollars back pay and her husband 
had received eight hundred dollars back pay from the rail-
road just prior to purchasing the property from Mrs. Kirk-
patrick (Tr. 63, 131-132). She also testified that her hus-
band was drinking away all his income at this time and was 
inebriated very often but that he never missed his work on 
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the railroad (Tr. 55-57). Furthermore, she did not deny 
that the original purchase contract was made in the name 
of her husband alone (Tr. 64-67). With respect to the exe-
cution of the deed from her husband to herself, thus ending 
their joint tenancy, Mrs. Dunham testified that Mr. Dun-
ham's illness prompted this action (Tr. 68) and that she 
and her husband consulted La Mar Duncan, an attorney, to 
prepare the deed (Tr. 68-69). However, in dealing with 
prospective purchasers of lots at arm's length, both before 
and after the purported date of execution of the questioned 
deed, Mrs. Dunham testified that the defendants never con-
sulted an attorney to prepare the necessary deeds which, 
by their nature, required new legal descriptions (Tr. 69-71). 
And, although the defendants were allegedly anxious enough 
about effecting a change of ownership that they sought out 
an attorney in Salt Lake City, Utah, to prepare the deed 
for them, they were not concerned with having it recorded 
(Tr. 72). Instead, the deed was purportedly placed in a 
steel box in Mrs. Dunham's bedroom and removed for re-
cordation only after Mr. Dunham's automobile accident 
(Tr. 72-73). Furthermore, Mrs. Dunham testified that the 
deed was dated and acknowledged as shown upon its face, 
but admitted that she never represented herself to be the sole 
owner to prospective purchasers following that date (Tr. 
76-77). Among the many Freudian "slips" evidencing com-
mon and accepted concepts of ownership and contributions 
and long, established matters of fact in the minds of the 
defendants concerning the property in question, plaintiff 
cites the following as illustrative : 
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1. When asked at what time the defendants left the 
railroad and moved into the property in question, Mr. Dun-
ham answered as follows at page 18 of the transcript: 
"A. Well, I think we-I don't remember, but 
we made the first-she made the first letter and the 
first-sent the first money to Mrs. Kirkpatrick I 
think and had the property. I don't know. It has 
been too long ago for me to remember." 
2. In response to a question concerning her husband's 
drinking habits on page· 55 of the transcript, Mrs. Dunham 
answered as follows : 
"A. Did you mean in the earlier part of our 
marriage, or did you mean after we negotiated for 
the property?" (Emphasis added.) 
3. In answer to a question as to when the property 
was originally purchased, Mrs. Dunham answered thusly 
at page 60 of the transcript: 
"A. Well, we-I think I sent a retainer-. I'm 
not exactly sure-! think I sent a retainer fee to sort 
of hold it, don't you see, until we got there, and I 
think I finished paying for it the day I moved in, if 
I am not mistaken. I don't recall exactly, but it 
seems to me that that was the way it was." 
And again on the same page when asked how much time 
elapsed from sending the retainer to Mrs. Kirkpatrick be-
fore the defendants moved into the property, Mrs. Dunham 
stated: 
"A. Well, I wouldn't know exactly because it 
was springtime-it was early spring when we-
when I negotiated with Mrs. Kirkpatrick, and it was 
May when I moved in." 
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4. Again, at page 63 of the transcript, in answer to a 
question concerning when the balance of the down payment 
was made to Mrs. Kirkpatrick, Mrs. Dunham testified: 
"A. The balance of that payment should have 
been made by May 1, when we took-when I took 
occupancy." 
Insofar as La Mar Duncan's testimony is concerned, 
he stated positively that the instrument was executed and 
acknowledged upon the dates shown on its face (Tr. 30-33). 
Thus Mr. Duncan could recall vividly the date that he ack-
nowledged a deed in a routine matter, but he thereafter could 
not remember, and in fact, denied, signing stipulated judg-
ments agains his client, Mr. Dunham, in excess of fifty 
thousand dollars as a result of the actions that arose from 
the automobile accident (Tr. 34-35). However, upon being 
shown the stipulated judgments in the trial records of the 
cases involved, he then remembered signing them (Tr. 37-
38). The court then sustained an objection by defendant's 
counsel to the evidence concerning the stipulations upon 
the ground that plaintiff's counsel had delayed Mr. Dun-
can's testimony 30 minutes because of stipulations claimed 
by plaintiff to be on the way to the court when in fact they 
were available to plaintiff all the time and for the further 
reason that this constituted impeachment of plaintiff's 
own witness (Tr. 38-39). The court thereafter refused 
plaintiff's counsel an opportunity to explain that affidavits 
actually on the way from Salt Lake City were the basis of 
counsel's request for delay in Mr. Duncan's testimony and 
not the stipulations produced. (Tr. 7, 28, 38, 41, and see 
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affidavit of Donn E. Cassity filed with the motion for new 
trial, R. 72-75). 
Mr. Lefler of the Kamas State Bank testified on direct 
examination directly opposite to Mrs. Dunham in that he 
claimed she was the spokes.man and handled all transactions 
concerning this property (Tr. 93) which is at variance 
with the statements of Mrs. Dunham (Tr. 66, 139). He 
claimed he was aware of the deed from Mr. Dunham to Mrs. 
Dunham when the first mortgage with his bank was ob-
tained in late 1953, but that the bank required the signa-
tures of both parties to the mortgage to conform to the 
county records (Tr. 93-95). On cross examination he stated 
that, although he had heard of the deed in question, he 
never saw it until it was recorded (Tr. 98-99). 
The testimony of defendants' witness, Le1and L. Layton, 
is most revealing. Upon direct examination, when asked of 
his knowledge concerning the execution of a deed from Mr. 
Dunham to Mrs. Dunham, he answered as follows, at page 
144 of the transcript: 
"A. I am referring to the deed of where George 
put the property fully into Leoda's name. That is 
the deed that I was going to give an answer to. In 
1953, the early part of 1953, George and I was out 
fishing at one time, and it was after his sickness at 
Coalville. He told me that he was going to put all of 
the property into Leoda's name." (Emphasis added). 
Upon cross examination he stated that this statement 
was made to him by Mr. Dunham in September or October 
after he purchased his first lot, which was August 5, 1953 
(Tr. 146-147). Again upon redirect examination concern-
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ing his know ledge of the deed in question, the witness re-
sponded as follows, at page 148 of the transcript: 
"Q. Had you had conversations with Mr. Dun-
ham prior to that time? You mentioned that you had 
knowledge of a deed or something. Now, is the deed 
"THE COURT: I don't know-I'm not sure he's 
said that he had any knowledge. He just told me that 
Mr. Dunham said he was going to put that property 
-going to put all his property in his wife's name. 
"A. The first-if I may, the first knowledge 
that I ever had of any deed was the day that George 
Dunham told me he was having a deed drawn up 
throwing all the property to Leoda. 
"THE COURT: And that is the day you have 
told me about here? 
"A. That was the day that-that's the day that 
I told you about there. 
"THE COURT: Some days when a man wishes 
he had stayed home in bed, aren't there, Mr. Pratt?" 
With respect to the testimony of Mr. Layton, as above 
set forth, the court opined as follows in granting the de-
fendants judgment for no cause of action, at page 155 of 
the transcript : 
"THE COURT: I have to ignore what Mr. Lay-
ton said there. Either he didn't understand, or else 
it was a man that doesn't have anything and still 
trying to impress somebody to make him think he's 
got it, or else he is in error on the date, or else he 
wanted to help and didn't know how. That was my 
impression, that Mr. Layton was trying to help his 
friends and didn't know how. The defendants may 
have judgment for no cause of action." 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT IS 




THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING 
AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
NUMBERED 4, 5 AND 7 FOR THE REASON 
THAT SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CON-
TRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING 
AND ENTERING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT OR WARRANT SUCH CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW AND SUCH CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAW PER-
TAINING TO FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 
AND DELIVERY OF DEEDS. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
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TESTIMONY OF LA MAR DUNCAN PERTAIN-
ING TO STIPULATED JUDGMENTS EN"" 
TERED IN THE CIVIL CASES BROUGHT BY 
BRUCE R. SIZEMORE AND FRED B. GAR-
RETT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT GEORGE 
R. DUNHAM WHILE MR. DUNCAN WAS AT-
TORNEY FOR SAID DEFENDANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT IS 
CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVI-
DENCE. 
By its very nature fraud, and the proof thereof, lies 
most conveniently nestled in the bosoms of those who are 
participants therein. The process of dislodging the truth 
from those nefarious hearts involves such ingenious devia-
tion as to make the odds of success most prohibitive. Such 
has been the task of the plaintiff in this case. In this regard 
it will be noted that the plaintiff's entire case necessarily 
rested upon the evidence to be adduced from the defendants 
and those in close confidential relationship with the defen-
dants, except for matters of public record. However, the 
seeds of fraud bear the tell-tale fruit of original sin as the 
facts of this case most eloquently display. 
There can be no argument that if the deed in question 
was actually executed after the date of the accident which 
gave rise to the creditors' claims against Mr. Dunham, it 
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would be fraudulent and void as to such creditors. An actual 
intent to hinder, delay or defraud, as would be shown by 
the falsification of the dates of execution and acknowledg-
ment of the deed involved in this case, would stamp this 
conveyance as fraudulent against the grantor's creditors 
even if the conveyance had been supported by a valuable 
consideration. Pomeroy's Equity Juris prudence, Fifth Edi-
tion, § 971; Sections 25-1-7 and 25-1-8, U. C. A. 1953. 
Let us now view the evidence with res.pect to the actual 
date of execution and acknowledgment of the deed in ques-
tion. Upon its face it is dated November 1, 1952, and ack-
nowledged the same date by the attorney who subsequently 
defended Mr. Dunham in the actions arising from the auto-
mobile accident on November 8, 1953. The date of recorda-
tion of this deed is most significant-November 27, 1953, 
nineteen days following the accident. Between November 
1, 1952, the purported date of the deed, and November 8, 
1953, the date of the accident, no less than eight conveyances 
of land were made by the defendants showing George R. 
Dunham and Leoda S. Dunham, his wife, as grantors. Dur-
ing this same period of time, a subdivision plat of the land 
was recorded at the request of George R. Dunham and a 
new mortgage was negotiated upon the property naming 
George R. Dunham and Leoda S. Dunham, his wife, as mort-
gagors. Not one single instrument was executed during 
this time designating Leoda S. Dunham as the sole owner 
nor did any single instrument even infer that such might 
be the case. Not so following the date of the accident and 
recordation of the deed in question. The county records 
from this time forward clearly indicate that ownership was 
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then being asserted by one person alone, namely Leoda S. 
Dunham. It is clear and undisputed that George R. Dunham 
exercised dominion and control over the sale of lots and 
represented himself as an owner of the property during the 
period of time between the purported date of the deed in 
question and the automobile accident referred to above. 
Mr. Dunham himself testified that he couldn't remember 
where or when he signed the deed but that it could very well 
be that it was brought to the Veteran's Hospital by Mr. 
Duncan following the automobile accident for his signature. 
This admission by the grantor himself fits perfectly the 
mosaic of fraud that all the remaining circumstances would 
indicate, but, unlike an inference to be drawn from circum-
stantial evidence, it is direct evidence of a fraudulent act 
committed with a fraudulent intent. Add to this the pre-
cise testimony of defendant's own witness, Mr. Layton, 
with reference to the statements made to him by Mr. Dun-
ham concerning the transfer of title to Mrs. Dunham. He 
positively established the time that said statements were 
made-subsequent to August 5, 1953, the date he purchased 
his first lot from the Dunhams. Upon direct examination 
and redirect examination by defendant's counsel he reiter-
ated that Mr. Dunham had told him that he, Mr. Dunham, 
"was going to put all the property in Leoda's name." Thus, 
long after the purported date of the deed in question, the 
grantor therein made known his intention to convey to his 
wife as a future possibility not as a matter of past actuality. 
It should also be borne in mind that if this witness had any 
interest to serve in the case it would be that of the defen-
dants and not the plaintiff. This evidence again establishes 
the actual intent of the defendants to defraud their credi-
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tors. In addition to the above let us consider the following 
circumstances surrounding this conveyance. The convey-
ance was voluntary and consisted of his entire estate. It 
left the grantor with no property yet obliged upon a mort-
gage note and subject to the claims of the two men injured 
in the accident, thus leaving him insolvent. The property 
description contained in the questioned deed is incomplete 
as compared to that conveyed to the defendants by their 
predecessor in title. At the time the deed was recorded, the 
accident had occurred and the notary public upon the ack-
nowledgment was one and the same person as the attorney 
who defended Mr. Dunham in the civil suits which arose 
from the automobile accident. It also seems singularly un-
usual that these defendants would deem it advisable to con-
sult an attorney for the purpose of preparing a deed as 
between themselves for their entire property and yet feel 
that such a practice was unnecessary before, and after, the 
accident insofar as preparing deeds, requiring special de-
scriptions to purchasers in business transactions. The 
reason given by defendants for the conveyance from joint 
tenancy to sole ownership in Mrs. Dunham, namely the 
claimed illness of Mr. Dunham, seems rather feeble in view 
of the recognized reason for holding property in joint ten-
ancy. Likewise the failure to record the deed promptly does 
not confirm the claimed urgency which purportedly 
prompted its execution. The subsequent petition in bank-
ruptcy by Mr. Dunham to be relieved of his obligations to 
the two judgment creditors who were injured in the acci-
dent on November 8, 1953, was the last step required to 
complete defendants' fraudulent scheme. 
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The only opposing evidence to that above set forth is 
the testimony of Mrs. Dunham and La Mar Duncan that 
the deed was executed and acknowledged upon the dates 
shown on its face. First of all it should be made absolutely 
clear that both of these witnesses had such interests in this 
deed as to prohibit their telling the truth if, as the above 
evidence clearly shows, the deed was in fact predated and 
fraudulently acknowledged. That they could have testified 
one way or the other without impunity is not true. An ad-
mission of fraud would have caused Mrs. Dunham the loss 
of her property. An admission of fraud would have caused 
Mr. Duncan the loss of his professional standing in all like-
lihood. Thus this testimony is not the testimony of disin-
terested witnesses. Quite to the contrary it is elicited from 
those most vitally concerned with the determination of 
whether fraud existed as a matter of fact in this case. 
Based upon the evidence in this case it is the plain-
tiff's contention that the overwhelming weight of the evi-
dence sustains the belief that this conveyance was made 
subsequent to the automobile accident giving rise to the 
creditors claims and that such conveyance was made with 
an actual intent on the part of the grantor and grantee to 
hinder, delay and defraud the creditors in the satisfaction 
of their claims and that the judgment of the lower court 
is contrary to the great weight of the evidence in the case. 
Plaintiff feels that the lower court in this case did not view 
the evidence with the "rigid scrutiny" required in convey-
ances between near relatives where creditors rights against 
one of such relatives is involved. See Paxton v. Paxton, 80 
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U. 540, 553, 15 P. 2d 1051; Peterson v. Peterson, 112 U. 554, 
190 P. 2d 140. 
Let us now assume, without admitting, that the trial 
court was justified in finding that the deed in question was 
actually executed and acknowledged upon the dates shown 
on its face. In view of the evidence, this conveyance must 
still fail as a matter of law. Section 25-1-7, U. C. A. 1953, 
provides as follows: 
"25-1-7. CONVEYANCE TO HINDER, DE-
LAY, DEFRAUD CREDITORS.-Every conveyance 
made, and every obligation incurred, with actual 
intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, 
to hinder, delay or defraud either present or future 
creditors is fraudulent as to both present and future 
creditors." 
Thus a showing of an actual fraudulent intent will render 
a conveyance fraudulent as to future creditors. The facts 
in this case clearly support a finding of actual intent to 
defraud to the exclusion of any other conclusion. The fail-
ure to record, coupled with continued possession and acts 
of ownership by Mr. Dunham, as evidenced by the deeds 
and mortgage subsequently executed by both defendants 
as grantors, is strong evidence of such an intent. Indeed, 
where the failure to record is coupled with other indicia of 
fraud, it may be concluded that the transaction was fraudu-
lent. See 24 Am. J ur., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 19, and 
cases therein cited. Likewise, it has been held that placing 
a deed in the hands of a grantee does not constitute delivery, 
where it is shown that the intention of the parties was that 
it was not to become operative immediately, and where such 
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intention was evidenced by continued acts of ownership and 
operation. Redmond v. Gillis, 346 Ill. 223, 178 N. E. 504; 
Spero v. Bove, 116 Vt. 76, 70 A. 2d 652. As stated in 4 
Tiffony Real Property, Third Edition, section 1045, page 
222: 
"* * * that the grantor acts as if the title 
had or had not passed to the named grantee would 
certainly appear to be strong evidence of his inten-
tion that the instrument should or should not oper-
ate to pass the title." 
See also Jeppesen v. Jeppesen, (Iowa), 88 N. W. 2d 633; 
Cardon v. Harper, 106 U. 560, 151 P. 2d 99, 154 A. L. R. 
960; Losee v. Jones, 120 U. 385, 235 P. 2d 132; Mower v. 
Mower, 64 U. 260, 228 P. 911. The assertion of title solely 
by l\'lrs. Dunham following the accident and recordation of 
the deed is further evidence that the defendants intended 
such conveyance to vest title in the grantee only in the event 
that unfavorable circumstances would warrant such a course 
of action. The testimony of defendants' witness, Mr. Layton, 
establishes that as late as September or October of 1953, 
Mr. Dunham was considering a future conveyance to his 
wife of his interest in the land. This is certainly incompat-
ible with the theory that he had absolutely conveyed his 
estate in the land to his wife almost a year previously or 
that he intended such a conveyance, if actually made, to 
alienate his interest at the time the deed was purportedly 
executed. But it is compatible and entirely consistent with 
plaintiffs' contention that the deed, if executed and ack-
nowledged as stated on its face, was intended to pass title 
only at such time as would be beneficial to the defendants 
and detrimental to creditors. In addition we have the un-
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disputed facts that the conveyance was voluntary and left 
the grantor insolvent. Section 25-1-4, U. C. A. 1953, sets 
forth the law of this state as follows: 
"25-1-4. CONVEYANCES BY INSOLVENT. 
-Every conveyance made, and every obligation in-
curred, by a person who is, or will be thereby ren-
dered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, with-
out regard to his actual intent, if the conveyance is 
made or the obligation is incurred without a fair 
consideration." 
In anticipation of defendants' contention that this convey-
ance was supported by consideration in that Mrs. Dunham 
allegedly paid the original down payment of $1,000.00 out 
of her own money, plaintiff submits that such a finding is 
absolutely contrary to the evidence and, under the evidence 
introduced in this case, is contrary to law. First of all, with 
reference to the question of fact, such an allegation is sup-
ported only by the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Dunham. In 
order to add credence to their story it is the testimony of 
both defendants that, at the time of the purchase, and for 
some time prior thereto Mr. Dunham was "drinking" away 
his entire income which exceeded that of his wife. Although 
they stated he was drunk a good deal of the time, which 
admittedly would be true if he were consuming his entire 
monthly salary of $225.00 for alcohol in the years immed-
iately preceding their original contract purchase of the 
property in 1944, yet it is admitted that he never missed his 
work with the Union Pacific Railroad as a result of intoxic~ 
tion. The most conclusive evidence against the defendants in 
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this regard is that the original purchase contract was made 
in the name of George R. Dunham alone. The evasive and 
qualified answers given by the defendant Leoda S. Dunham 
in this regard, without denying the fact, are ample to sup-
port this fact. It would seem most unlikely that Mrs. Dun-
ham would use her own money to purchase real property and 
then have it placed in her husband's name alone at a time 
when he is alleged to have been a confirmed drunk. These 
facts just do not adhere to logic and common sense. It also 
seems most unlikely that Mrs. Dunham would allow her 
husband to continue as an apparent owner, without his 
making any real contribution to the business property, for 
the 91f2 years following the purchase, which apparent title, 
in all probability would have continued to this day had not 
the automobile accident intervened. It is also stated by 
both defendants in their testimony that Mr. Dunham partici-
pated in the negotiations with Mrs. Kirkpatrick for the pur-
chase of the property. Contrary to the above we have the 
statements of the defendants that it was Mrs. Dunham's 
money which purchased the property. The facts do not 
bear out that contention. 
Secondly, as a matter of law, the statements of the 
defendants are not sufficient to sustain a finding that the 
alleged fraudulent conveyance was based upon a pre-existing 
consideration or obligation. In the case of Paxton v. Paxton, 
supra, a mortgage allegedly based upon a past due indebted-
ness to the defendant's brother was sustained as valid in 
the lower court against the plaintiff's contention that it 
constituted a fraudulent conveyance. This court, upon a 
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complete analysis of the facts by virtue of its equity powers, 
reversed the lower court and held as. follows : 
"In reaching a conclusion as to facts, the find-
ings made by the trial court should not be disturbed 
unless we are convinced that they are wrong, but, 
when so convinced, it becomes our duty to set them 
aside. It is quite generally held that a transfer or 
mortgage of property between near relatives which 
is calculated to prevent a creditor from realizing on 
his claim against one of such relatives is subject to 
rigid scrutiny. 27 C. J. 495, and cases there cited. 
Under the rule, a transfer or mortgage of property 
made to a near relative in consideration of past-due 
indebtedness will be sustained if attacked in a cred-
itor's suit when, and only when, it is shown the debt 
is genuine, that the purpose of the grantee or mort-
gagee is honest, and that he acted in good faith in 
obtaining his title or lien. The burden, in such ease, 
is cast upon the grantee or mortgagee to show the 
good faith of the transaction by clear and satisfac-
tory evidence. * * * Applying the rule to the 
mortgage made by Anthony and his wife to Frank, it 
cannot be said that Frank has discharged that bur-
den. * * * There is not a scintilla of evidence, 
other than the testimony of Frank and Anthony, 
which shows, or tends to show, that Anthony was 
indebted to Frank at the time the note and mortgage 
were executed. * * * there is no documentary 
evidence other than the note and mortgage here in-
volved which supports, or tends to support, the claim 
that Anthony was indebted to Frank. Such claim 
rests solely upon the testimony of Anthony and 
Frank. Upon this record the appellants are entitled 
to a finding that the mortgage given by Anthony and 
his wife to Frank was without consideration and that 
it was executed for the purpose of hindering, delay-
ing and preventing the Walkers from collecting the 
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money owing to them by Anthony and his wife Ida." 
(Emphasis added.) 
As in the case quoted, there is not a scintilla of evidence, 
other than the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Dunham which 
shows, or tends to show, that the original consideration for 
the purchase of the property in question was paid by Mrs. 
Dunham. Under the ruling of the Paxton case, which re-
versed the lower court on the facts and law, the defendants 
have not met the burden of showing the good faith of the 
transaction by clear and satisfactory evidence. The holding 
in the Paxton case was affirmed and approved in Boccalero 
v. Bee, 102 U. 12, 126 P. 2d 1063, which was distinguished 
on the facts in that there was ample evidence, such as can-
celled checks and records of payment, of the debt owed 
by the insolvent grantor to his sister as consideration for 
the assignment. It is thus crystal clear that something more 
than the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Dunham will be re-
quired to establish the bona fides of their claim-that addi-
tional something is lacking in the record of this case. 
Without burdening the court with a long list of author-
ities sustaining certain factual circumstances which consti-
tute "badges of fraud", the plaintiff herewith sets forth the 
many "badges" or "indicia" of fraud which exist in the 
present case and from which the existence of fraud may be 
properly inferred: 
1. Inadequacy of consideration, 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent 
Conveyances, § 81. 
2. Conveyance which leaves the grantor without any 
estate or renders him insolvent. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Con-
veyances, §§ 88, 89. 
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3. Withholding instrument from recordation. 37 C. J. 
S., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 85. 
4. Retention by the grantor of the possession of the 
property and thereafter exercising acts of ownership with 
the knowledge of the grantee. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Con-
veyances, § 92. 
5. Close relationship between grantor and grantee, as 
husband and wife. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 
96. 
6. Misdescription or insufficient description of the 
property transferred. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Conveyances, 
§ 97. 
The concurrence of several badges of fraud will always 
make out a strong case. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Convey-
ances, § 79. As we have shown heretofore, where the fail-
ure to record, is coupled with other indicia of fraud, it may 
be concluded that the transaction was fraudulent. Likewise, 
as previously pointed out, the continued acts of ownership 
and statements of the grantor following the purported exe-
cution of the deed, is conclusive evidence that no present 
intention to convey the land was shown as of the date it was 
allegedly executed and acknowledged even though the deed 
was manually transferred to the grantee. See Redmond v. 
Gillis, supra. In view of the failure of defendants to sustain 
the burden of proving the actual purchase of the property 
by Mrs. Dunham with her own money, both as a matter of 
fact and as a matter of law, and the concurrence of the 
above mentioned badges of fraud, it necessarily follows 
that the conveyance from George R. Dunham to his wife 
was a fraudulent conveyance in fact and in law against the 
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creditors of defendant George R. Dunham. If the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the case and directly proved are 
such as, to lead a reasonable individual to the conclusion 
that fraud in fact exists, this is all the proof which the law 
requires. 24 Am. J ur ., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 225; Car-
don v. Harper, supra. 
Finally it may be laid down as a doctrine generally 
accepted, that if a person, being at the time indebted, makes 
a voluntary conveyance of his property to such an extent 
that he is left actually insolvent, or wholly unable to pay 
his existing debts, or that it is reasonable to suppose he 
contemplated his consequent inability to pay, or even that 
it is reasonably doubtful whether he is able to meet his obli-
gations, then the conveyance will be fraudulent and void 
as against his subsequent, as well as his existing creditors. 
Pomeroy's Equity Juris prudence, Fifth Edition, § 973, pp. 
880-881. 
A careful analysis of the facts of this case, together 
with the law governing delivery of deeds and fraudulent 
conveyances, compels a reversal of the judgment of the 
district court. This court has the power to review both facts 
and law in equity cases by virtue of express statutory pro-
vision and the rules of procedure established by this court. 
See Section 78-2-2, U. C. A. 1953 and Rule 72 (a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In the exercise of this power 
to the ends of justice this court should find, as a matter of 
fact and law, that the conveyance from defendant George 
R. Dunham to his wife, defendant Leoda S. Dunham, was 
fraudulent as to his creditors who are represented by the 
plaintiff in this action, and should therefore set aside this 
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conveyance and require an accounting of all proceeds re-
ceived by the defendants from the sale of portions of their 
land. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING 
AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
NUMBERED 4, 5 AND 7 FOR THE REASON 
THAT SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CON-
TRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
Fact No. 4 found by the lower court holds that Leoda 
S. Dunham paid the down payment upon the property from 
her own money and the balance from the earnings, of the 
property (R. 64). Plaintiff incorporates herein his argu-
ment under Point I with respect to the weight of the evi-
dence. Plaintiff also incorporates herein the argument con-
tained in Point I with regard to the law governing the find-
ing of a pre-existing consideration based solely upon the 
statements of the grantor and grantee. The rule in the 
Paxton case, supra, which was affirmed in Baccalero v. Bee, 
supra, is clearly controlling in this case. In the absence of 
other extrinsic evidence, the bare statements of the grantor 
and grantee as to a pre-existing debt or obligation consti-
tuting the, consideration for a voluntary conveyance be-
tween near relatives will be insufficient, as a matter of 
law, to sustain the finding of such consideration as a matter 
of fact where the conveyance is attacked by the grantor's 
creditors. Such is the case here. Not one whit of evidence 
was introduced to support the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. 
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Dunham in this. regard and, as pointed out under Point I, 
all other evidence indicates the absolute opposite fact to 
that found by the lower court. 
Finding of Fact No. 5 is to the effect that the deed in 
question was executed, acknowledged and thereafter deliv-
ered to Leoda S. Dunham on November 1, 1952, and Find-
ing of Fact No. 7 holds that the deed was executed and de-
livered without intent to defraud (R. 66). Plaintiff in-
corporates the argument contained in Point I to sustain 
its contention that such findings are contrary to the over-
whelming weight of evidence and also contrary to the law 
governing fraudulent conveyances. and the delivery of deeds. 
Plaintiff again reiterates that, even if the lower court had 
sufficient evidence upon which to find that the deed was 
actually executed and acknowledged on November 1, 1952, 
the subsequent acts of ownership by Mr. Dunham without 
objection by Mrs. Dunham absolutely negatives the finding 
of a present intent to deliver even though there had been 
a manual delivery of the deed. In addition the surrounding 
circumstances amplify beyond question the fact that no 
present intent to convey was ever made manifest by the 
parties to this deed and that the deed was not to become 
operative. immediately. See Redmond v. GiUis, supra; Spero 
v. Bove, supra; Cardon v. Harper, supra; Losee v. Jones, 
supra; 4 Tiffany Real Property, supra. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING 
AND ENTERING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS NOT 
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SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT OR WARRANT SUCH CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW AND SUCH CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAW PER-
TAINING TO FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 
AND DELIVERY OF DEEDS. 
As pointed out under points I and II, it was clearly 
error for the lower court to enter its Conclusions, of Law 
to the effect that the conveyance herein involved was not 
made with an intent to defraud, hinder or delay existing or 
subsequent creditors, that the deed was executed, acknowl-
edged and delivered on N ovemher 1, 1952, and that the gran-
tor, George R. Dunham, had no interest in the said property 
subsequent to that date, as set forth at pages 66-67 of the 
Record on appeal, and plaintiff incorporates herein the 
arguments set forth under points I and II. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
TESTIMONY OF LA MAR DUNCAN PERTAIN-
ING TO STIPULATED JUDGMENTS EN-
TERED IN THE CIVIL CASES BROUGHT BY 
BRUCE R. SIZEMORE AND FRED B. GAR-
RETT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT GEORGE 
R. DUNHAM WHILE MR. DUNCAN WAS AT-
TORNEY FOR SAID DEFENDANT. 
As has been stated heretofore the plaintiff's case in this 
action, being one of fraud, lay primarily in the evidence to 
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be elicited from the defendants and those in close confiden-
tial relationship with the defendants, outside of matters 
of public record. Intent, which is an important element in 
cases of fraud, is most often a matter of difficult proof 
because of its concealment in the minds of the perpetrators. 
In this case the actual date of the deed and the acknowledg-
ment thereon were drawn in issue. If fraud had actually 
been committed in this case by the pre-dating of the deed 
and acknowledgment, and the great weight of evidence so 
indicates as shown in the argument under Point I, Mr. Dun-
can became as much a participant in the fraud as did the 
defendants. Let us now view the circumstances giving rise 
to this particular point of argument. 
Mr. Duncan was called as a witness at the trial by the 
plaintiff. During questioning by plaintiff's counsel, Mr. 
Duncan testified that he clearly remembered the date he 
acknowledged this deed which was prepared as a routine 
matter in his law office and that it was dated and acknowl-
edged on the dates shown thereon (Tr. 30-33). Subsequent 
to this testimony he denied having ever signed stipulated 
judgments on behalf of his client, George R. Dunham, in 
excess of fifty thousand dollars in 1954 as a result of civil 
actions arising from the automobile accident (Tr. 34-35). 
Upon being shown the stipulations in the county clerk's case 
files, Mr. Duncan admitted signing the stipulated judgments 
(Tr. 37-38). Thereupon the defendant renewed his objec-
tions and the court responded by striking the entire line of 
questioning (Tr. 38-39). There can be no question that 
plaintiff was attempting to impeach this witness. The court 
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even recognized this when it denied defendants.' earlier 
objection by stating as follows: 
"MR. PRATT: If the court please, I object to 
that as hearsay as to these defendants. This is their 
witness. 
"THE COURT: I'm not taking it as a fact. I 
suppose he is laying a foundation for some impeach-
ing question he is going to ask counsel or trying to 
show an interest that counsel has. The objection is 
overruled and you may answer that question." (Em-
phasis added) . 
A close examination of the transcript will reveal that the 
true cause of the trial court's sudden change of ruling arose 
out of a mistaken concept in the mind of the trial judge that 
plaintiff's counsel had attempted to delay Mr. Duncan's 
appearance on the ground that certain written documents 
were allegedly on their way from Salt Lake City when in 
fact they were in the possession of plaintiff's counsel all 
the time. In this regard it will be noted that counsel for 
plaintiff asked for the delay of Mr. Duncan's appearance 
as a witness because of certain conflicting affidavits to 
which he was a party which were then on their way to Coal-
ville from Salt Lake City. (Tr. 7, 28. See also the affidavit 
and supporting documents filed with the court by Donn E. 
Cassity, R. 72-75). Upon the introduction of the stipulated 
judgments entered in prior civil cases against Mr. Dunham 
and signed by his then attorney, Mr. Duncan, the court was 
clearly under the impression that these documents were 
the ones claimed by plaintiff's counsel to be on their way 
from Salt Lake City. The judge's impression thus left him 
with the feeling that plaintiff's counsel had resorted to a 
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concealment of facts before the court. In fact, the court's 
unjustified wrath was such that he absolutely refused to 
listen to plaintiff's repeated attempts to explain the true 
circumstances (Tr. 38-39). 
It is plaintiff's contention that the rule against im-
peaching one's own witness. should have no application as to 
Mr. Duncan who was the acknowledging officer before 
whom the deed in question was executed. With respect to 
the prohibitory rule against impeachment of one's own wit-
ness, it is stated in McCormick on Evidence, § 38, at pages 
70-71: 
"Among the reasons, or rationalizations, found 
for the rule are, first, that the party by calling the 
witness to testify vouches for his trustworthiness, 
and second, that the power to impeach is the power 
to coerce the witness to testify as desired, under the 
implied threat of blasting his character if he does 
not. The answer to the first is that, except in a few 
instances such as character witnesses or expert wit-
nesses, the party has little or no choice. He calls 
only those who happen to have observed the partic-
ular facts in controversy. The answer to the second 
are (a) that it applies only to two kinds of impeach-
ment, the attack on character and the showing of 
corruption, and (b) that to forbid the attack by the 
party calling leaves the party at the mercy of the 
witness and his adversary. If the truth lies on the 
side of the calling party, but the witnesses character 
is bad, if he tells the truth he may be attacked by 
the adversary: if he tells a lie the adversary will not 
attack him, and the calling party, under the rule, 
cannot. Certainly it seems that if the witness has 
been bribed to change his story, the calling party 
should be allowed to disclose this to the court." 
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It has been stated in many cases that the rule against im-
peachment of one's own witness is subject to exception in 
the interests of justice. Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 U. 543, 
196 P. 2d 968, rehearing denied 113 U. 560, 198 P. 2d 473; 
Delfino v. Warners Motor Exp., 142 Conn. 301, 114 A. 2d 
205; White v. Southern Oil Stores, 198 S. C. 173, 17 S. E. 
2d 150. Thus it has been stated that the purely formalistic 
concept, that the party producing a witness vouches for 
him and is bound by his testimony, should not preclude im-
peachment where fairness requires it, and the trial court 
should be liberal in permitting such impeachment, resolving 
all doubts in favor of allowing testimony. People v. Spinosa, 
115 C. A. 2d 659, 252 P. 2d 409. 
This court has had occasion to construe the testimony 
of an acknowledging officer upon a deed. In the case of 
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 112 U. 268, 
248 P. 2d 692, this court quoted with approval from 1 Am. 
Jur. 380, Acknowledgment, Sec. 154, which states: 
"* * * The trend or authority however, is 
in favor of admitting any evidence that may have a 
tendency to prove the truth, and a more liberal rule 
permits the officer to be called as a witness. and 
compelled under oath to state the true facts of the 
transaction so far as he can remember them, whether 
he acted under mistake, misapprehension, or in col-
lusion with the party to be benefited by taking the 
acknowledgment * * * " 
The court then held : 
"We are in accord with the foregoing rule as 
better serving the purpose of getting at the truth 
and doing justice between the parties." 
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Furthermore our own Rules of Civil Procedure have 
broadened the scope of cross examination and impeachment 
to include many persons. other than strictly adverse parties. 
Thus, although not himself a party to an action, an officer 
of a corporation, partnership or association which is an 
adverse party, may be called and cross-examined and im-
peached in all respects as if he had been called by the ad-
verse party. See Rule 43 (h) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Certainly Mr. Duncan in the instant case re-
posed in a position much more adverse to the plaintiff than 
that presented in most cases which might involve an officer 
of a corporation as a witness. It would seem that if such 
persons as are enumerated in Rule 43 (b) may be called 
as one's own witness and impeached, it is only logical that 
the acknowledging officer to the execution of deed claimed 
to be fraudulent as to its date of execution and acknowledg-
ment should likewise be subjected to the test of cross exami-
nation and impeachment as to his memory, veracity, truth-
fulness, etc. 
Plaintiff would make one more comparison. There can 
be no doubt that a party may impeach the testimony of a 
witness whom he is compelled to call, as a subscribing wit-
ness to a will, etc. See 98 C. J. S. Witnesses, § 477 (c); 
Re Warren, 138 Ore. 283, 4 P. 2d 635, 79 A. L. R. 389; 
Schlatter v. McCarthy, supra. Thus it would appear no less 
logical to allow a party attacking the validity of a deed and 
acknowledgment on the grounds of fraud to call, as his own 
witness, all parties to the claimed fraudulent instrument and 
to cross examine and impeach them, if possible, in an effort 
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to disclose the element of intent so guardedly concealed 
within them. 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff contends that the 
lower court erred in striking from the record the damaging 
evidence brought out by the cross examination of Mr. Dun-
can. No attorney could ever hope to be believed in asserting, 
on one hand, that he could recall definitely the date of 
execution and acknowledgment of a deed prepared as a 
routine matter in 1952, and then, on the other hand, 
suffer a lack of memory to the point of denying that 
he had executed stipulated judgments in excess of fifty 
thousand dollars as counsel for the same parties in late 1954. 
Such evasiveness and lack of sincerity are circumstances 
which the plaintiff should have been permitted to show 
in proving the fraud alleged in this action. 
CONCLUSION 
A close examination of the facts and the law applicable 
in this case reveals the following: 
1. The trial court's finding that Mrs. Dunham bought 
the subject property with her own money is contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence and being based upon the testi-
mony of defendants alone, cannot be sustained as a matter 
of law. 
2. The trial court's finding that the deed in question 
was executed and acknowledged on November 1, 1952, is 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. 
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3. That, even though the lower court may have found 
that the deed was dated and acknowledged on November 1, 
1952, its further finding that the deed was delivered on that 
date is contrary to the great preponderance of evidence and, 
in view of the continued acts of ownership and assertion of 
title by Mr. Dunham thereafter with the grantee's knowledge 
and consent cannot be sustained as a matter of law. 
4. The facts and circumstances surrounding the con-
veyance in question, even if dated and acknowledged upon 
November 1, 1952, would necessarily lead reasonable indi-
viduals to the conclusion that fraud was intended by these 
defendants as to pres-ent and subsequent creditors and, in 
view of the many concurring badges of fraud, including fail-
ure to record coupled with continued acts of ownership by 
Mr. Dunham, it may be concluded that the conveyance was 
fraudulent as a matter of law. 
The plaintiff, therefore, is of the opinion that this 
appeal is justified both as to the facts and the law andre-
quests that this honorable court set at rest, once and for 
all, the fraudulent scheme of the defendants that has caused 
this plaintiff, and the creditors whom he represents, to 
pursue a trail of litigation covering a period of five years 
with only such solace as was contemplated by Shakespeare 
in Henry VI: 
"Thrice is he arm'd that hath his quarrel just, 
And he but naked, though lock'd up in steel, 
Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted." 
Plaintiff asks this honorable court to (1) set aside the 
conveyance from defendant George R. Dunham to his wife, 
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defendant Leoda S. Dunham, as a fraudulent conveyance cal-
culated to defraud, hinder and delay the creditors of George 
R. Dunham; (2) order the defendants, to account for the 
proceeds of all sales or alienations of all or any part of said 
property subsequent to said fraudulent conveyance ; ( 3) 
order the defendants to account for all income derived from 
said property or the use thereof subsequent to said fraudu-
lent conveyance; ( 4) order the said property to be disposed 
of in satisfaction of the claim of plaintiff in order that said 
plaintiff can properly marshall the assets of the estate, of 
the bankrupt defendant, George R. Dunham; ( 5) restrain 
the defendant, Leoda S. Dunham, from disposing of said 
real property in any manner, or from alienating the same; 
( 6) grant the plaintiff his costs incurred in the court below 
and upon this appeal, and (7) order such other and further 
relief as to the court shall appear proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DONN E. CASSITY, 
JACK L. CRELLIN, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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